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NATURAL LAW ACTUALITIES
MIRIAM THERESA ROONEY*
A RECENT ARTICLE in the Catholic Lawyer' devotes its opening
paragraph to an elaboration of the statement: "Two concepts
are characteristic and basic in natural law jurisprudence." Throughout
the article reference is made to "concepts" as if they were essential for
convincing expositions of the natural law "school." This article, of
course, is not unique in this respect. Rather, it is only the latest ex-
pression of the theme. Thirty-five years ago, C. G. Haines published
a much-quoted book entitled The Revival of Natural Law Concepts,
which, in its very title, discloses the irreconcilable conflict between
concepts and actualities.
Numerous defenders of natural law theories have for some centuries
based their arguments upon conceptualistic premises and borrowed
the words from one another without apparently questioning their
implications. Now and then, challenges have been presented by jurists
unconvinced by this line of reasoning, but these have been ignored
for the most part, when not rejected preemptorily. Surely, an inquiry
as to whether concepts are, in fact, basic in natural law jurisprudence
is long past due.
First of all, it would seem obvious that concepts are human things;
their content being nothing more nor less than what the human mind
has abstracted from its experiences. It is doubtless true that not every
mind has had identical sense experiences from which concepts may be
derived. Many receive concepts conveyed from teacher to pupil as
part of the inherited wisdom of the human race. Such concepts, how-
ever, along with all other concepts, have been formulated somewhere,
sometime, somehow, by some acutely perceptive mind. It is essential
to the learning process to inquire from what perceptions of ear or eye
these concepts were derived. It is no less essential to ask what was
left out when these abstractions were made.
Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law.
1Cahill, Morality in Legal Practice, 11 CATHOLIC LAW. 184 (1965).
Poets have told us that there are many
things in heaven and earth which are not
dreamt of in our philosophies. Radio
waves must have been going over our
heads for ages, but were not trapped by
attuned antennae until our own day. The
relation of energy to matter has also
waited for the current century to be ex-
plained in a mathematical formula, and
the transmission of human characteristics
through cell division or combination is
under scrutiny now in depths never before
attempted. Concepts derived from obser-
vations or perceptions such as these must
surely vary in content, if not in complexity,
from those accepted earlier. Does modern
natural law jurisprudence, it may properly
be asked, take such variations in the con-
tent of its concepts into account?
There are some who, when confronted
with new manifestations of scientific truth
which are in effect revolutionary, and,
which may appear disruptive of philo-
sophical premises theretofore thought to
be firmly established, seem to neglect a
reformulation of their premises. They
abandon, in fact, if not in profession, the
philosophical method itself-with its task
of satisfying human reason-and, instead,
they turn to revelation, but without noting
the steps necessarily taken in preparation
for such a leap.
The transition from scientific truths to
that aspect of truth which is in the human
judgment, and from immutable truths to
absolute truth, presents a tortuous path,
where many have become confused, and
have been led unwittingly into fallacies.
If the foundations could be clarified on
this, perhaps a univocal usage of the term
"natural law" might hopefully be reached.
Since revelation itself must ultimately rely
12 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1966
on the appeal to reason to become known,
its proper function in natural law theory
is one of verification of the truth that is
in the human judgment, rather than as an
alternative for the laborious reexamina-
tion of basic premises.
The fact is that the human mind, in its
efforts to ascertain truth, is measured by
its conformity to nature. In other words,
all things measure mind. And truth, or
knowledge of nature, is achieved only ac-
cording to the mind of the knower. That
is to say that by the nature of human
beings they are not omniscient; their capa-
city for perception is only partial, because
of the natural limitations of their senses;
the aspect of truth they can glimpse is
far from the wholeness of the universe
in time and space; and man, unable to see
life steadily and to see it whole, cannot
be the measure of all things.
It is the existent universe which is the
most important feature in human life. The
learning process by which man becomes
increasingly aware of the relation of his
life to the rest of existence is not only
fascinating in itself but it has importance,
hitherto largely unexpressed, for the com-
prehension of the natural law. In the
natural order, the child, even before it is
born, becomes conditioned to such ele-
mentary sensations as warmth and nourish-
ment. When it is born, it gives testimony
of life by a cry, as the ancient legal test
for inheritance recorded. As it grows, it
is aware not only of heat and cold, of
hunger and nourishment, but also of light
and shade, of its ability to reach and to
kick, and eventually of persons other than
itself. It acquires power to listen, to
comprehend communications from others,
to concentrate; it realizes self-motivation
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and assumes self-responsibility in its ad-
vancement on the road to maturity. But
the grasp of otherness outside itself is
always conditioned by the acuteness of its
perceptions.
Those who attempt to teach can do no
more than point out things worth noticing,
so that the student may make them his
own. For each step in the learning process,
the most impressive fact is that the person
is already predisposed by previous experi-
ence to reach out and grasp what is near
at hand. That for which he is unprepared
by previous experience eludes him unless
or until brought to his attention by some-
one a bit more experienced. Even a
simple statement is rarely grasped at first
hearing, but becomes familiar by each re-
petition: "Once I've said it; twice I've
said it; three times I've said it; it's true!"
we are told by snark psychology in "Alice
in Wonderland." As in the case of radio
waves, the existent may be quite within a
student's grasp, but entirely beyond his
degree of awareness. The principle of
apperception, or the being prepared to see
the obvious, is such a vital part of the
development process that even the Gospel
narrative mentions it: "I have yet many
things to tell you, but you cannot bear
[i.e., are not yet prepared to receive]
them now."
The principle spoken of as apperception
by modern psychologists of education,
especially Herbart and Pestalozzi in Ger-
many, and William James and Edward
Pace in the United States, is not only im-
portant for educators, but valuable for
lawyers as well, particularly in presenting
argument to both judges and jurors. It is
of special significance for those jurists who
are struggling with the meaning of immut-
able truth.
The most immutable truth (if that is
not an unacceptable redundancy) is the
fact of the existence of the universe into
which each person is born. The partial
truths which are discovered through scien-
tific methods of investigation, or the in-
sights into the harmony of the universal
order which are glimpsed by artists, are,
at the very most, but aspects noted in
time and space of universal truth or ex-
istence. Without touching upon theology
or revelation, as such, it is manifest that
the universe around us must have been
designed, or created, if you will, by some
Person with an intellect infinitely greater
or more complex than any within our
earthly experience. Whether we call this
Person, God, or the Supreme Architect of
the Universe, or by any other similar name,
the vitality of the universe, which is the
only thing that really matters, is obviously
derived from, or kept alive by, Him. When
our intellects grasp an aspect of this ex-
istent fact, and Factor, we perceive truth.
When our emotions impel us toward a
bit more fullness of life, we recognize it
as good. In both situations, being and
truth, and, being and good, are inter-
changeable, but knowable to us, for learn-
ing purposes, only under particular aspects.
A falling short of our mind in conformity
with the universe as it actually exists
amounts to error, and we must try again.
A falling short of our choices in the en-
richment of life, is not only misapprehen-
sion, but also evil, and we must retrace
our steps and start over, to fill up the
deficiency. In both cases the measure of
our achievement is nothing more nor less
than the universe as it actually exists. And
the Judge who measures our acts is in
His Person identical with the true, the
beautiful, and the good, in the fullness of
existence. This is no mere concept, nor
attribution, of our limited minds. This is
the basic fact of life. It is verifiable by
Holy Writ, where God the Creator defines
Himself in the very terms of being and
existence, when He says, "I am Who am."
We reduce this consummate fact at our
peril when we make our minds and our
concepts the measure.
Although being surrounds us, and we
participate in it, it is nevertheless so vast
a fact that it is very difficult to compre-
hend. Aspects catch our eye in succession,
as a child is taken by each new toy.
Reality somehow eludes our consciousness
most of the time. When it does confront
us, we are often so ill-prepared to receive
it that we are distraught in our confusion.
The courage it takes even to attempt to
look upon life steadily and to make an
effort to see it whole is heroic. It is here
that the natural law jurists could help.
By preparing each of us to widen our
grasp of reality and the facts of life, they
could have guided us toward expanded
content as the basis of our judgments, and
to an infinity of alternatives suggested by
nature, as the ground upon which our
choices can be made. Instead they have
presented us all too frequently with no-
thing more than warmed-over human con-
ceptions of a mare clausum era, quite in-
adequate to open our eyes to the actually
existent and continually unfolding universe
which the Creator has created.
One prevailing error that modern jurists
stumble over, which is not attributable to
the natural law "school" as such, but
which could be clarified by them, if they
substitute actualities for concepts, is the
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Kantian separation of will and idea. When
Immanuel Kant ascribed the function of
the intellect to the speculative reason, and
the function of the will to the practical
reason, he assigned law to the latter cate-
gory. Some defenders of the natural law,
already preconditioned by the voluntarism
of Scotus or Suarez in contrast with the
intellectualism of Aquinas, accepted the
classification of law as a concern of the
will, minimized the task of intellect in
ascertaining facts upon which choices are
made, and left judgment out of account.
By failing to relate human judgment to
universal truth by explaining its function
of limited participation in ascertaining one
aspect of existent reality, the natural law
theorists have permitted current interest
in decision-making to struggle alone with
arbitrariness, and have left the task of
judgment unattended.
Another insistent difficulty, attributable
to Kantian influence, concerns justice.
Through Del Vecchio's reading of the
"golden rule" in connection with the cate-
gorical imperative of Immanuel Kant, a
view of justice has recently developed that
emphasizes the word "others" in the pre-
cept, to do unto others as you would be
done by. In the Del Vecchio view, this
gives rise to a claim. In other words,
justice, it is inferred, arises from the claim
one person has upon another to obtain
his due. This emphasis on others provides
a sociological slant to the notion of justice;
the suggestion of a claim is thought to be
essentially juristic; the suggestion that
justice to me depends upon my asking or
claiming my due introduces a subjective
rather than an objective standard. This
view is not only novel and at variance
with the traditional definition-the render-
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ing to each his due, or his own-but it
also leaves out of account the actualities
of existence which the ancient definition
of Ulpian contained. Far from being a
claim, or a concept, justice is nothing
more nor less than the apportioning to
each person of whatever he actually needs
to attain the fullness of life, whether he is
aware of his need and claims it, or not.
The emphasis should not be on the appor-
tioning but upon what is due. It is upon
this very definition of justice that a juris-
prudence of concepts and a jurisprudence
of actualities go off in opposite directions.
A valid "school" of natural law juris-
prudence cannot have it both ways. To
be a true guide to the natural law-the
law of nature-it must by its very terms
affirm a universal existent order, created
by a Person who explains Himself in terms
of being-"I am Who am"-and Who
has situated human beings within that uni-
verse with limited, not omniscient, powers
of comprehending its order. To attempt
to identify this universal existent order
with any humanly derived concepts about
it is to deny the very universality and the
existence that some natural law writers
presume to defend.
Is such a limited view of human con-
ceptual powers in fact a retreat to skep-
ticism that the human mind can never
know any truth? Not at all. It simply
means that human concepts must be sub-
ject to continual revision in order to con-
form to newly recognized truths.
A corollary of the distinction which
must be made between actualities and con-
cepts in the exposition of natural law
principles is that a similar distinction has
to be made between truths, and universal,
absolute, or immutable truth. There is no
doubt that universal, absolute, and im-
mutable truth exists, and that it is identical
in the Supreme Being with the good and
the beautiful. The differing terms used to
denote the Supreme Being represent at-
tempts to describe the learning process
and to emphasize that human knowledge
is limited to aspects, or glimpses, and is
unable to grasp the wholeness of reality
with the omniscience of the Creator. To
misconceive these terms so as to ascribe
immutability to any particular aspect is
to invert the order of existence in such a
way as to ascribe to the creature the
capacity of the Creator. Man has enough
problems as it is for his burdened spirit to
encompass. To claim for his humanly
derived concepts the immutability which
is an attribute of the Supreme Being alone,
constitutes a grave fallacy in many writings
on the natural law. What is needed by
way of a corrective is an historical sense,
or an investigatory technique on the evi-
dence, in order to track the formulation
of a truth to its human source. Then the
thought of continual revision in order to
conform more closely to newly discovered
or recognized truths would not be revolting
but challenging.
Is it too much to hope that the aggiorni-
amento of the Vatican Council will spill
over onto the jurists and provide a new
look for the natural law situation that will
present a satisfactory account of the rela-
tion between human laws and the law of
nature-between concepts and actualities?
